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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NED C. JENSEN, WOODROW E. 
HAYWARD, RAY F. CROSHAW 
I 
A. FOSS PETERSON and LOWELL 
D. OSWALD, 
Pia i ntiffs-Appella nts, 
vs. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case 
No. I 0930 
Respondent's Brief on Appeal 
Respondent agrees with the appellants' statements as to 
the kind of case, disposition in the lower court and the relief 
sought on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with substantially all the appellants' 
Statement of Facts except to note that the statement relating 
to the question of a special meeting and the manner of filing 
of the requests for removal of names is not complete and 
there are other facts which ought to be stated. 
The area in question is a sort of Texas-shaped tract with 
an average dimension of about one-half mile, in the South-
western part of Bountiful, the panhandle at the southerly 
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end, and bounded by other city territory on three sides (map, 
Exhibit "F"). As of December 14, 1966, the date the petition 
for annexation was filed with the city recorder, there were 
431 owners of real property as shown by the Official Records 
of the Davis County Recorder within the territory described 
in the plat or map attached to the petition (R-11). The 
county assessment rolls which are prepared by the county 
assessor from the information provided by the county re-
corder showing the record owners within the area as of Jan-
uary 1, 1966 (17-21-22 as amended 1965), reflect that there 
were 373 names on the 1966 assessment rolls (R-36). The 
difference between the 431 as shown by the recorder's rec-
ords as of December 14, 1966, and the 373 names as shown 
by the assessment rolls as of January l, 1966, is apparently 
caused by transfers after January 1, 1966, where larger 
parcels were subdivided or ownerships otherwise divided. 
The following summaries appear on Exhibits "G" and "H": 
OWNERS OF RECORD 
TOTAL 
ONE-HALF 
431 
215.5 
VALID SIGNATURES 243 
REQUESTS FOR WITHDRAW AL 26 
BALANCE IF WITHDRAWAL ALLOWED 217 
OWNERS ON ASSESSMENT ROLLS 
TOTAL 373 
ONE-HALF 186.5 
VALID SIGN A TURES 199 
REQUESTS FOR WITHDRAWAL 26 
BALANCE IF WITHDRAWAL ALLOWED 173 
The petition for annexation carried a majority under 
either method of determining ownership except that if the 
26 owners are allowed to withdraw and the assessment rolls 
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are used as the basis of determining ownership, there would 
not be a required majority. 
Four of the five plaintiffs were personally present at a 
meeting of the city council on Wednesday December 7 1966 
' ' ' when the council decided in favor of annexing the territory 
(R-12) and set the following Wednesday, December 14, 1966, 
to act finally upon the annexation (R-18) and this same 
date was previously fixed by the council to consider the 
annual audit reports (R-16). On Wednesday, December 14, 
1966, after the council had convened, conducted preliminary 
business and called for action on the petition for annexation, 
Mr. West presented directly to the council, not to the city 
recorder, a list of 31 signatures requesting that their names 
be removed from the petition for annexation. Of the 31, five 
had not signed the annexation petition, leaving 26 requesting 
withdrawal (R-21). The city council denied the request for 
withdrawal, adopted an ordinance of annexation on Decem-
ber 14, 1966 (R-5), and caused the ordinance and plat to be 
recorded on December 20, 1966 (R-11). Since January 1, 
1967, the city has supplied city services to the annexed area 
consisting of police and fire protection, street services and 
garbage collection; and made preparations for supplying 
electricity and other city programs to the annexed area 
(R-13). 
On January 31, 1967, the Complaint was filed. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent replies to appellants' six points of argument 
in the same order but with paraphrased headings in some 
instances. 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFFS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE WAS RE-
STRICTED IN TIME AND SUBJECT MATTER. 
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Plaintiffs as private persons cannot challenge an annex-
ation ordinance after it takes effect, and any challenge there-
after is limited to jurisdictioned matters. 
The Annexation Ordinance was dated December 14 
1966, and recorded together with a plat in the office of th~ 
Davis County Recorder on December 20, 1966, whereupon 
the annexation was completed. The action in this cause was 
filed on January 31, 1967, more than 30 days after the effec-
tive date of the ordinance. 
The appellants rely on rule 65B(d) U.R.C.P. as giving 
the appellants a right to commence a suit where the Attor-
ney General fails, after notice, to bring suit for relief allow-
able under rule 65B(b) (1); however, the latter provision 
does not mention any right of action against a city, and par-
ticularly no right to a collateral attack upon the corporate 
boundaries. 
Most courts hold that a private person, if he has any 
standing to challenge an annexation at all, must do so before 
the ordinance takes effect and his suit is to prevent any 
action which would result in allowing the ordinance to be-
come effective, whereas after the effective date of the ordi-
nance, the only one having the right to challenge is the 
Attorney General. It was held in Colquhoun vs. City of 
Tucson, et al., 55 Ariz. 451, 103 P.2d 269, that where the rec· 
ord of annexation appears to be a valid proceeding on its 
face, only the Attorney General or the County Attorney may 
question the validity of an annexation of territory to the city; 
although, where a proceeding is invalid on its face and be-
fore completion thereof, a private individual may bring suit 
to prevent the completion of an attempt to change the 
boundaries of the municipality for lack of jurisdiction. 
A more recent Arizona case, Burton vs. City of Tucson, 
88 Ariz. 320, 356 P.2d 413, held that a citizen may not attack 
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an annexation ordinance after the same is complete but may 
enjoin the city during the process of annexation where it is 
alleged that the city lacks jurisdiction of the property. This 
was also a case where the ordinance was an emergency meas-
ure and was not published, but the court held that it became 
effective upon passage, even before the expiration of 30 days, 
without publication, as an emergency measure. 
Colorado, in the case of Griffin vs. City of Canon, 362 
P.2d 200 (1961), held that where Canon City annexed a town 
of Canon under a statutory proceeding, and after ordinances 
pursuant thereto were enacted, a private person had no 
standing to challenge the validity of the ordinance. The court 
cites 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations, Section 66, page 177, 
in support of its holding, that unless the proceedings are 
wholly void for want of authority or jurisdiction, their valid-
ity is not subject to collateral attack; hence, where even a de 
facto, not a de jure, municipal corporation is established, it 
may be challenged only through the Attorney General. Sec-
tion 66 of C.J.S. further states that unless the proceedings 
are absolutely void for want of authority or jurisdiction their 
validity is not subject to collateral attack and the informal-
ities or irregularities such as sufficiency of description, lack 
of hearing, are merely collateral. 
Also to this effect are 37 Am. Jur., page 649, and the 
' 
Supplement on Municipal Corporations, Section 32. We quote 
from the Supplement, Section 32, as follows: 
"While there is some authority to the contrary, the 
view generally taken is that where proceedings alter-
ing municipal boundaries have been carried to com-
pletion by public officials having jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, and acting under at least colorable 
authority, their irregularities in procedure will not 
clothe a private individual with capacity to attack 
collaterally such boundary changes. In some cases, 
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in_ apparent conformity with this rule, the courts 
without differentiating between a direct and a colla~ 
teral attack, have held or indicate that a private 
party has no capacity to attack the fixing or exten-
sion of municipal limits. The general rule is based 
upon public policy and while it would appear to be 
in opposition to established legal or equitable prin-
ciples in that a private party is seemingly without 
remedy for what may be a private wrong, neverthe· 
less the feeling is that at least a de facto corporation 
is formed embracing the new territory, and to allow a 
private attack against the existence of such a muni-
cipality would result in undesirable consequences to 
the public welfare." 
The foregoing Am. Jur. citation was referred to in support 
of the decision of Dixon vs. City of Bremerton, et al., 25 
Wash. 2d 508, 171 P.2d 243, wherein it was stated that Wash-
ington follows the general rule as announced in Am. Jur. and 
that any holdings to the contrary are the minority rule. 
The extension of corporate boundaries has been held to 
be a legislative and ministerial function and not a judicial 
function. Plutus Mining vs. Orme, 76 Utah 286, 289 P. 132, 
holds that the creation of a city and fixing of territorial limits 
is essentially a legislative and not a judicial function (citing 
19 Utah 368). Public policy requires that city boundaries be 
certain and definite at all times, not only for local adminis-
trative, but for tax purposes. This holding was followed in 
Re Town of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391, 326P.2d105, which 
distinguished the changing of the territorial limits of a muni-
cipal corporation as primarily a legislative and not a judicial 
function, from the disconnection of lands under 10-4-1 and 
2 U.C.A., 1953, as a judicial function. 
California decisions hold that the determination by a 
city council of the number of qualified owners signing a peti-
tion for annexation is not a judicial act and being a mere 
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ministerial act, it cannot be questioned in a court proceeding, 
Gardner vs. Tugunga, 140 Cal. App. 351, 35 P2d 562, and 
407 P.2d 325. 
A recent Kansas case decided December 2, 1966, Bab-
cock vs. Kansas City, et al., 197 Kan. 610, 419 P.2d 882, held, 
in effect, that the many previous decisions of Kansas which 
have never permitted a private individual to bring an action 
attacking the legality of the corporate existence of the city 
including the extension of the corporate limits, had not been 
changed by a change in procedure which allowed a suit by 
a private person attacking an adverse resolution or ordi-
nance. The right to attack the corporate entity or existence 
cannot be modified by such a procedural change. 
The relief provided by Rule 65B U.R.C.P. is limited to 
instances "where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy exists ... " The plaintiffs, in this instance, had a 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in that they could have 
challenged the annexation ordinance before the same became 
effective and complete. The ordinance provided that it was 
to become effective the day after its first publication and its 
first publication was Friday, December 16, 1966, and it was 
not recorded until December 20, 1966. It would have been 
possible for an action to be commenced anytime between 
December 14 and December 20, 1966. Also, if the plaintiffs 
had in mind withdrawing their names after December 7, 
1966, they could have tendered the withdrawal earlier and 
commenced suit any time after December 7, 1966. Further-
more, assuming that the emergency provision should not 
have been allowed, suit could have been brought within the 
30 day period, but the plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of 
this remedy. The case of State vs. Ryan, 41 Utah 327, 125 
P. 666, cited by appellants, was one in which Murdock and 
others obtained leave from the district court to file an infor-
mation in the nature of quo warranto to test the validity of 
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the organization of Wasatch High School District. Murdock 
would have had a right to maintain an action in the nature 
of an election contest as to whether or not certain votes were 
legally cast without asking leave from anyone, but the time 
for bringing the action had past. The court stated at 
page 336, 
"It was, however, a remedy which the respondent 
could have invoked, and thus, instead of seeking to 
dissolve a public corporation he could have prevented 
its organization, and would thus not have been re-
quired to intermeddle with or assail any rights be-
cause none would have then have existed." 
The court, at page 335, quotes with approval the following: 
"Private individuals who have no interest other than 
as citizens, residents, and taxpayers of a municipal 
corporation cannot maintain an action of quo war-
ranto against such corporation." 
The court further stated that the interest of a resident and 
taxpayer within the school district is not such an interest as 
will authorize an action quo warranto to test the validity 
of a public corporation, although, such corporation is only a 
school district with limited and defined powers. The court 
says that such corporation is, nevertheless, one that is 
created by the laws of this State and is an arm of the State 
through which the State Government, to some extent at 
least, is benefitted. Under comment 4 on page 336, the court 
said that a private individual has no right to rush into the 
courts of the State to ask to dissolve a governmental agency. 
The remedies of contesting the election and for quo war-
ranto may be cumulative only where a private individual has 
a special interest. At the bottom of page 338, the court states, 
"Our statutes, however, does not permit, nor can the 
courts of this State allow, a citizen to interfere with 
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the state agencies without showing that he has some 
special interest which requires protection." 
The court stated that the lower court should have sustained 
the demurrer. 
Rule 65B(d) should be viewed as granting a private 
person a procedural right where he also has a substantive 
right to bring the particular action. The foregoing cases 
indicate that no substantive right exists in favor of a private 
person to attack an annexation ordinance. To hold other-
wise would make it possible for several separate suits by a 
number of private persons at varying times to attack the 
corporate boundaries, whereas, if only the Attorney General 
has the right to sue in such cases, his suit is binding upon all 
concerned. 
POINT II 
ELIGIBILITY TO SIGN AS OWNER A PETITION 
FOR ANNEXATION rs TO BE DETERMINED 
FROM THE RECORDS OF THE COUNTY RE-
CORDER AS OF THE DA TE OF FILING THE 
PETITION. 
The statutory provision relating to annexation of con-
tiguous territory, 10-3-1 U.C.A., 1953, as amended in 1957, 
is set forth in appellants brief, page 8. Prior to the 1957 
Amendment, 10-3-1, did not contain the phrase "and the 
owne1·s of not less than one-third in value of the real prop-
erty, as shown by the last assessment rolls." Thus prior to 
the 1957 Amendment all that was necessary was that a 
majority of the owners of real property in the territory 
lying contiguous to the corporate limits sign such a petition. 
The subsequent addition of the 'phrase "and the owners 
of not less than one-third in value of the real property 
shown by the last assessment rolls" was to assure that the 
majority also represented a substantial value of property 
being annexed and it appeared to the legislators that to avoid 
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other proof of value, a reference could be made to the assess-
ment rolls for the purpose of determining value, only. Since 
a person who acquires his property after January 1 is not 
placed on the assessment rolls until the following year, the 
other interpretation would be totally unfair in that a person 
who had acquired his property after January 1 would not be 
an eligible signer if he were required to be on the assessment 
rolls, whereas, the person who sold the property to him and 
having no further interest therein, would be a proper person 
to sign as petitioner. The parenthetical phrase, "as shown by 
the last assessment rolls", appears to be limited only to the 
question of the value of the real property by mechanical con-
struction of the statute, if not the fair intent thereof. It 
would be unreasonable and unfair to interpret the statute 
in such a manner that a subdivider contiguous to a city could 
subdivide his county land and sell all of the lots during one 
year, and before January 1st of the following year, file a 
petition for annexation of the subdivision to the contiguous 
city, in which event, although he had no further interest in 
the subdivision or lots, he could cause the lots to be annexed 
and the persons then owning and in possession would be 
powerless to act. 
The proper construction of the word "owner" is set 
forth in the case, in Re City of Smithfield, 70 Utah 564, 262 
P. 105, (1927). In a suit for disconnection in determining 
whether a majority of the owners signed for disconnection, 
the court said: 
"As title and rights to real property vary from ab-
solute and unqualified fee simple to that of mere oc· 
cupant, so the word 'ownership' varies. in its signi,: 
ficance, according to the context and subJect matter. 
"The word 'owner' as used in statute, is given the 
widest variety of construction, usually guided in some 
measure by the object sought to be accomplished tn 
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the particular instance. It has led some courts to 
declare that the word has no precise legal significa-
tion, and may be applied to any defined interest in 
real estate." 
The legislative intent is to be analyzed in the light of 
its history, background and purpose sought to be accomplish-
ed. (Sjostrom vs. Bishop 15 Utah 2d 373). Accordingly, the 
incident which brought about this 1957 amendment requiring 
one-third valuation to be represented, was the annexation 
by North Salt Lake on April 21, 1952, wherein the Town 
which had about 480 acres when organized, sought to annex 
an additional area of over 3,440 acres including some valu-
able industrial sites such as Standard Oil of California's Salt 
Lake Refining Company which itself contained 468 acres. 
On August 7, 1952, the first suit for disconnection was filed 
but failed for jurisdictional reasons (Howard vs. Town of 
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216) and a sub-
sequent suit, 7 Utah 2d 278, 323 P.2d 261, decided March 28, 
1958, upheld the disconnection of part of such annexed land 
because the disconnected portion represented 61 % of the 
total valuation of the town prior to the disconnection and 
could be provided no benefits to off-set the burdens, and as 
such, it was held to be inequitable and unjust to allow annex-
ation primarily for tax revenues. It was this circumstance 
that stimulated legislation to require representation of at 
least one-third valuation. Since valuation is a relative matter, 
the legislature removed the uncertainty of the method of 
evaluation by tying it to the assessed valuations which have 
a direct relation to tax burdens. There was no expressed or 
implied difficulty before the amendment to determine the 
question as to who is an owner for purposes of signing a peti-
tion. If the definition of "owner" was a purpose of the 
statute it would seem that the legislature would also have 
' inserted a similar provision in 10-4-1 defining an "owner" 
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for purposes of disconnection procedures, but the latter 
statute remains as before requiring only a "majority of real 
property owners" to sign, with no further definition. 
From the foregoing analysis it would appear clearly to 
be the legislative intent that "owner" for purposes of annexa-
tion or disconnection is defined as stated in Re City of Smith-
field, supra, in a practical manner to give the party who is 
concerned as owner of a beneficial interest in the land the 
right to vote for its annexation. This position is supported 
by some important rules of statutory construction contained 
in many cases including Utah cases which are consistent with 
respondent's contention that the phrase "as shown by the 
last assessment rolls" modifies only the phrase "the owners 
of not less than one-third in value of the real property". The 
general statement of the rule is that relative or qualifying 
words are to be applied to the words immediately preceding 
or following, unless a legislative intent is indicated that a 
different application be made. 
(a) A Washington decision which is representative of 
many cases before and after is that of APPLICATION OF 
ANDY 302 P. 2d 963, 49 Wash. 2d 449. The court reaffirmed 
the following rule as it applies to a summary of the facts 
hereinafter stated: 
"When a contrary intention does not appear in a 
statute, relative and qualifying words and phrases, 
both grammatically and legally ref er to the last 
antecedent. The last antecedent is the last word 
which can be made an antecedent without impairing 
the meaning of the sentence. . . . In this instance, 
the last antecedent is the word 'reservation'." 
The facts in that case involved an Indian who was convicted 
in state courts for burglary where the act was committed 
12 
-
within the Indian reservation but upon land owned by a non-
Indian. Federal jurisdiction was exclusive in "Indian Coun-
try" which is defined as 
"(a) All land within the limits of any Indian reser-
vation under the jurisdiction of the United St.ate 
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent .... " 
The court held that grammatically and legally the under-
lined portion modified "reservation" and not "land'" hence ' , 
the Indian on the non-Indian land within the reservation was 
subject to federal, not state jurisdiction; whereas if it modi-
fied "land", the non-Indian land would not have been under 
the jurisdiction of the United States Government. 
(b) State vs. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955. The court 
announced the rule in this case to be: 
"By the Rules of Construction the relative or quali-
fying words are to be applied to the words immediate-
ly preceding or following, unless the legislative intent 
is indicated that a different application be made. 
(cites 59 C.J. 985)." 
A statute before amendment read: 
" ... nova caine, flowering tops and leaves, extracts, 
tinctures, and other narcotic preparations of hemp 
or loco weed (cannabis sativa, indian hemp), I 
mariguana / or chloral hydrate or any of the 
salts, derivatives, or compounds of the foregoing sub-
stances .... " 
The 1927 amendment inserted the word "mariguana", follow-
ing the parenthetical phrase (cannabis sativa, indian hemp) 
and it was held that the underlined phrase did not modify 
or apply to mariguana. If the phrase had applied to mari-
guana the defendant contended that he could not be guilty 
unless he had possession of the mariguana plant or weed in-
13 
stead of just the cigarettes which he had. It was held that 
the underlined phrase modified or applied to "hemp or loco 
weed", only. 
(c) The following California cases support the rule that 
a limiting clause in a statute is to be confined to the last ante-
cedent, unless the context or the evident meaning of the 
statue requires a different construction. Elbert, Limited vs. 
Gross, 260 P.2d 35, 41 C.2d 322; People vs. Ortiz, 195 P.2d 
82, 86 C.A.2d Supp. 937. 
Some other rules of statutory construction that are 
helpful are the following: 
( 1) The primary rule of construction of a statute is to 
ascertain and declare the intention of the legislature and to 
carry such intention into effect; Allen vs. Board of Educa-
tion, 236 P.2d 756, 120 Utah 556; Rogers vs. Wagstaff, 232 
P.2d 766, 120 Utah 136; 
(2) With respect to the meaning of statutes, it is appro-
priate to look to the intended purpose and to the means of 
accomplishing it by proper application of the language used. 
Andrus vs. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 404, P.2d 972; State 
Land Board vs. State Department of Fish and Game, 17 
Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707. 
(3) Where legislative intent is not clear and a literal 
interpretation of language of statute gives an absurd result, 
the court may search the enactment for further indications 
of legislative intent by examination of wording of the act or 
consideration of the underlying purposes. The intention of 
the lawmaker will prevail over literal sense of terms, and, 
when words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected 
from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law 
and the remedy in view, and the intention is to be taken or 
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presumed according to what is consonant with reason and 
good discretion. Rowley vs. Public Service Commission, 185 
P.2d 514, 112 Utah 116. 
Ownership of property is better determined from the 
records of the county recorder than from the assessment 
rolls. In any matter relating to title or right to deal with an 
interest in real property, the practice of all attorneys, ab-
stractors or knowledgeable persons dealing with land is to 
search the records of the county recorder to determine the 
ownership or right to deal in the land. The assessment rolls 
are the proper records to search for current proportionate 
valuation and then to determine against whom the assess-
ment was made. The assessment rolls are the properly re-
ferred to in determining the question as to who are "such 
qualified electors as shall have paid a property tax". The 
case of Thompson vs. City of Centerville, cited by the appel-
lants also refers to record owners in the sentence following 
the one quoted by the plaintiff as follows: 
"This, since any such payment inures to the benefit 
of the record owner,-who is the one against whom 
and whose property the government would move to 
satisfy any tax obligation,-not a wife, conditional 
sales vendee, mortgagee, mechanic lien claimant, ... " 
Thus the Thompson case refers to "legal owners of real 
property" and "record owners" and indicates that a wife by 
her statutory dower has no present interest in her husband's 
property. The reference to the official assessment and tax 
rolls was only to determine who was entitled a credit for 
having paid the property tax. 
POINT III. 
THE REQUESTED WITHDRAWAL BY 26 PER-
SONS WAS UNTIMELY AND WAS PROPERLY 
REFUSED. 
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Most courts hold that there is no right of a person to 
withdraw his name from a petition for annexation after 
it has been filed with the officer authorized to receive the 
same for filing. While there are many courts who have in-
dicated the right of withdrawal in other types of petitions, 
for referendum, improvement districts and the like, even in 
these instances, the courts hold that the right to withdraw is 
never allowed once action has been taken upon the petition. 
In the case of State vs. City of Phoenix, 74 Ariz 46, 
243 P2d 766, the court stated under comment 5: 
"In the instant case when the city council had regu-
larly convened to consider the annexation ordinance 
and vote upon it, the wheels of legislative action were 
set in motion and jurisdiction had attached so that 
the time for withdrawing of signatures had expired." 
The Arizona Court referred to an exhaustive annotation in 
126 A.L.R. 1031, which annotation deals with withdrawals 
of petitions generally, but cites only two cases in the entire 
50 page annotation which relate to petitions for annexation 
and in both instances, the court held that with respect to a 
petition for annexation, names could not be withdrawn. The 
first annexation case is cited at page 1034 of the annotation, 
Denny vs. Bellevue (1908), 18 Pa Dist R 839, stated as a 
conclusion of law that 
"Petitioners who had signed the petition (to admit or 
annex certain land to a borrough) could not there· 
after withdraw their names without the consent of 
all other signers and the consent of the borrough .. ·" 
"It seems clear that they affix their names to a peti-
tion, as in this case, for a specific purpose, they enter 
into a contractual relation, not only with the body 
to which the petition is addressed, but to each other. 
The fact that one person will sign influences others 
to do so, or that one had signed is a moving cause for 
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others to follow as example, relying on his judgment 
and discretion ... " 
A Pennsylvania case annotated at page 1071 shows a deci-
sion of a county court which allowed the petitioners for 
the incorporation of area of the borrough to withdraw their 
signatures upon leave of the court. It is to be noted that both 
of these cases were decided in 1908 in Pennsylvania, the 
former in the district court and the latter in the county 
court. Another case on annexation cited at page 1038, in Re 
McLeod (1904), 4 Ont. Week Rep. 26, held that persons 
signing a petition filed with a municipal council requesting 
annexation of the municipality in question to an adjacent 
municipality were not at liberty to withdraw their signatures 
in the absence of showing that their signatures were obtain-
ed by fraud or bad faith. California, in the case of Rogers vs. 
Pasadena, held that the electors who signed a petition for 
annexation of certain territory to the city, could not, by 
thereafter withdrawing their names, deprive the board of 
directors of the city of jurisdiction, where, after the petition 
was filed, all of the electors requested withdrawal of their 
signatures and the city council took no action to place the 
matter of annexation on the ballot, as required by law, and 
upon suit of Rogers, the Supreme Court held that the City 
Council had a duty to proceed with the ballot in that the 
withdrawal of the names could not defeat the jurisdiction of 
that body. 218 Cal. 221, 22 P.2d 509. 
The Utah Courts do not appear to have passed on the 
question of withdrawing names from a petition for annexa-
tion but have considered the problem of withdrawal of names 
from petitions in the following cases. Halgren vs. Welling, 91 
Utah 16, 63 P.2d 550, cited by appellants where writs of man-
date and prohibition were requested against the Secretary 
of State in connection with an initiative and referendum, 
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wherein the statute required the petitions for initiative or 
referendum, when signed and verified, to be delivered to the 
county clerk who was to check the names and file the same 
with his notation with the Secretary of State. After the peti-
tions were filed by the respective clerks with the Secretary 
of State but before any action was taken by the Secretary 
of State to determine the sufficiency thereof, there was a 
petition filed withdrawing 9,092 names and the majority of 
the court held that the withdrawal was timely, since no 
action had been taken by the Secretary of State. The dissent 
of Justice Wolfe contended that no withdrawal should be 
permitted after the county clerk received the petitions. How-
ever, the majority of the court did say, and cited other 
cases which hold, that the weight of authority is that the 
withdrawal may be made at any time before the petition has 
been acted upon, citing Salt Lake and Utah RR Company vs. 
Payson City, 66 Utah 521, 244 p. 138, which said that it was 
proper for a person to withdraw his protest against a special 
improvement so long as the withdrawal was made in the 
time in which protests could be received and indicates that 
the jurisdiction of the city to proceed with the improvement 
or not to proceed is dependent upon the state of the record 
at the time that the city acquires jurisdiction. The Payson 
case cites Armstrong vs. Ogden City, 12 Utah 476, 43 p.119, 
which held that a protestant cannot withdraw his protest 
so as to vest jurisdiction in the city to make the improvement 
after a sufficient number of owners have protested to defeat 
the jurisdiction, so as to reinvest the city with jurisdiction to 
make the improvement. It would appear, by these decisions, 
that once the city had acquired jurisdiction, then no with-
drawal would be effective. 
Assuming an analogy between the Utah cases just con-
sidered and the instant annexation case, it would appear that 
such time as a majority of owners petitions for annexation 
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and the petition was filed with their recorder, as required 
by law, jurisdiction was then vested in the city to determine 
the matter at its next meeting. The attempted withdrawal of 
names by the 26 persons came after the matter was called 
for consideration by the council and was presented directly 
to the council and not filed with the recorder. It would 
appear that at the time the council commenced to consider 
the petition, any attempt to withdraw the names was 
untimely. 
The cases referring to initiative and referendum are not 
a good comparison for the reason that such petitions only re-
quire five percent or ten percent of the electorate to petition 
to place an item on the ballot for further election and ballot-
ing. This is in contrast to a petition for annexation which 
must contain a majority and calls for no further action by 
the petitioners and only requires action from the body being 
petitioned. The statute as worded for annexations makes it 
entirely proper for a majority to file a petition with the city 
recorder at the close of business on the day in which the 
council is to meet and the council that very evening is re-
quired to take up the matter. It would seem that so far as the 
petitioners are concerned, once they have filed the petition 
with the city recorder and the city recorder has referred the 
matter to the city council for its determination there cannot 
be a withdrawal of a few names which frustrate jurisdiction 
and this should be so, more particularly, where there are a 
great number of persons signing the petition. The appellants 
refer to an analogy in a civil action where the plaintiff has 
right to withdraw or dismiss a complaint; however, they lose 
sight of the fact that where there are many plaintiffs it re-
quires consent of all for a voluntary dismissal, and the with-
drawal of one or more does not dismiss as to all and the court 
retains jurisdiction; furthermore, the court would not allow 
the withdrawal by some of the plaintiffs where such with-
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drawal would substantially affect the rights of the other 
plaintiffs remaining or would oust the court from jurisdic-
tion. In the cases of disconnection where a petition is filed 
by a majority of property owners with the clerk of the dis-
trict court, it has been held that the court does not acquire 
jurisdiction until a majority has filed, and this majority can-
not be made-up by subsequent intervenors, although inter-
venors are allowed after a majority has first filed. Hence, 
in Howard v. North Salt Lake (1955) 3 Utah 2d 189, the 
Supreme Court held that there was no jurisdiction where the 
petition filed with the clerk did not contain a majority of real 
property owners in the area desired to be disconnected. As-
suming that a majority had filed with the Clerk and the 
court thus acquires jurisdiction, can a few withdraw to oust 
the court of jurisdiction? Cases from other states do not 
allow a withdrawal once the court has acquired jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the petition for annexation should not be 
made analogous to any other proceeding other than an an-
nexation proceeding because it is different by its very nature 
and most courts have held that there is no right to withdraw 
a petition for annexation. The annotation in 27 A.L.R. 2d 604 
at page 608 states as follows: 
"In California it is held, apparently as an invariable 
rule, that after a petition or remonstrance has been 
filed with the proper public officer or body, a signer 
cannot withdraw his signature". 
POINT IV. 
THE COUNCIL MEETING OF DECEMBER 14, 
WAS INF ACT A REGULAR MEETING. 
At the council meeting on December 7, 1966, the council, 
at the suggestion of the mayor, agreed to meet on December 
14, 1966, to consider an audit report and other matters 
(R-16), and by separate resolution, unanimously adopted by 
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the council, the proposition of annexation of this subject 
area was to be considered at the December 14 meeting 
(R18). Subsequently, the word "special" in reference to the 
December 14, 1966, meeting, was stricken by council resolu-
tion to conform to the facts (R-25). Four of the plaintiffs 
were present and all of the plaintiffs were informed of the 
meeting scheduled for December 14, 1966, and all were rep-
resented by counsel at said meeting. The pertinent statute 
and the city ordinance relative to meetings of the city council 
are 10-6-19 Utah Code Annotated and 2-3-2 Revised Ordi-
nances of Bountiful, as follows: 
10-6-19. City council meetings - Call of special 
meetings.-The city council in cities of the third 
class shall prescribe the time and place of holding its 
meetings; provided, that at least one meeting shall 
be held each month, and the mayor or any two mem-
bers of the council may call a special meeting by giv-
ing notice of it to each of the members of the council, 
served personally or left at his usual place of abode. 
Section 2-3-2 CITY COUNCIL l\IEETINGS, REGU-
LAR AND SPECIAL 
The City Council shall by resolution prescribe the 
frequency, time and place of meetings of the City 
Council; provided, that at least one meeting shall 
be held each month. In the absence of other provision 
therefor by resolution, if a meeting day falls on a 
legal holiday, the regular meeting shall be held on 
the next business day following, and adjourned meet-
ings shall be held from time to time as circumstances 
may require. The Mayor or any two Councilmen may 
call special meetings by issuing a written notice to 
such Members thereof, served personally or left at 
his usual place of residence, and no business shall be 
transacted at any special meeting except that stated 
in the call thereof, unless all Councilmen are present 
and unanimously consent thereto. (10-6-19) (R12) 
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By said statute and ordinance, special meetings are called by 
the mayor or any two members of the council by notice as 
distinguished from meetings provided by resolution of the 
council itself. The council had not theretofore by resolution 
prescribed the time and place of holding its meetings (Rl2). 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Volume 4, page 450 to 
453, states that if a meeting is otherwise regular, it is all 
right to schedule other meetings than those set forth in 
formal ordinances or resolutions for "regular" meetings. The 
text also quotes from a New Jersey case that "a stated meet-
ing is one appointed by the council". State vs. Jersey City, 
25 N.J.L. 311. 
The apparent reason for the statutory requirement that 
the petition for annexation be voted upon at the next regu-
lar meeting is to avoid a delay. It does not appear that the 
provision was for the purpose of giving notice and opportu-
nity to be heard because, in fact, there is no provision for 
notice to either the persons signing the petition or those not 
signing. Those who have signed the petition should not 
object to an early decision on their petition, and those who 
have not signed, being the minority, are not mentioned in the 
statute as having any right of notice or opportunity to be 
heard. However, in the instant case the complaining parties 
were all adequately notified and actual notice with opportu-
nity to be heard should preclude a challenge as to whether 
or not this meeting were special or regular. 
POINT V. 
WHETHER THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTIRE 
ANNEXED TERRITORY WAS, OR NEEDED TO 
BE, ATTACHED TO THE PETITION BEFORE 
FILING. 
10-3-1 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 1957 does not require 
that the plat accompany the petition which is circulated for 
22 
signature but merely requires that when the petition, in 
writing, signed by majority, is filed, a plat or map, made 
under the supervision of the city engineer, shall be filed in 
the office of the recorder. The statute provides "they shall 
cause an accurate plat or map of such territory to be made", 
but does not require that the map be circulated with the 
petition. 
It is sufficiently clear that all of the protestants and all 
persons who signed the petition were aware that their tracts 
would be included in the proposed annexation. 
POINT VI. 
THE CITY COUNCIL HAS LEGISLATIVE DIS-
CRETION TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF 
AN EMERGENCY TO JUSTIFY SHORTENING 
THE TIME OF EFFECTIVE DATE OF AN AN-
NEXATION ORDINANCE. 
Bountiful was faced with the deadline of having the 
annexation complete and the plat recorded before January 1, 
1967, in order to have the tax rolls reflect that the annexed 
property was within its boundaries for purposes of personal 
property taxation. Faced \vith the necessity of supplying 
services beginning January 1, 1967, the council was entitled 
to protect its source of revenue. 
10-6-12 Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides that ordi-
nances shall go into effect on the 20th day after publication 
or the 30th day after final passage, except that measures 
necessary for the immediate preservation of peace, health or 
safety of the municipality may, if so provided in the ordi-
nance, take effect at an earlier date. 
That an annexation may be the subject of an emergency 
measure is implied in the decision of Burton vs. City of 
Tucson, 88 Ariz. 320, 356 P.2d 413, where the ordinance was 
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enacted as an emergency measure, and as such was not pub-
lished nor required to be published if determined to be an 
emergency measure, and the court held that it became effec-
tive upon passage before 30 days without publication, as an 
emergency measure; hence, a citizen was not allowed to 
attack the annexation ordinance after the same was com-
plete, having become effective upon its passage without 
publication. 
The case of Fladung vs. City of Boulder, Colorado 
(1966), 417 P.2d 787, held that where an ordinance creating 
an improvement district provided that it shall take effect 
upon passage as an emergency measure, it was not subject 
to attack by suit. The court held that this could not be an 
issue in that it had been decided many times that the recital 
"necessary for the immediate preservation of the public 
peace, health or safety" is a legislative and not a judicial 
question. 
Another Colorado case, Western Heights Land Corp. vs. 
City of Fort Collins, 362 P.2d 155, held that the failure to 
state facts of an emergency in an ordinance does not of itself 
render the ordinance void and in such event, the effective 
date, only, is postponed. 
An Oregon case, Greenberg vs. Lee, 196 Or. 157, 248 
P.2d 324, held that where the city council enacts an emer-
gency ordinance pursuant to City Charter, the wisdom or 
expediency of the council's determination of the existence 
of an emergency, is not subject to judicial review, and the 
legislative finding on the necessity of the emergency is con-
clusive on the courts. 
A rule of construction assisting the determination of 
whether the time element is mandatory or directory is stated 
in Sjostrom v. Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373 at page 377: 
"The general rule is that a statute, prescribing the 
time within which public officers are required to per· 
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.. 
form an official act, is directory only, unless it con-
tains negative words denying the exercise of the 
power after the time specified or the nature of the 
act to be performed, or the language used by the 
legislature shows that the designation of time was in-
tended as a limitation." 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the appellants had no 
standing to challenge the validity of the annexation ordi-
nance and even assuming the right to challenge, after there 
is a determination that the city council had reasonably con-
cluded that a majority of owners had executed the petition 
and pursued it to enact an annexation ordinance no other 
incidental or collateral matters connected with the proceed-
ings may be considered after the effective date of the ordi-
nance. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
~~/?~ 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 4th South 
Bountiful, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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